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A philosophical reflection on the “Leuven Scale” and young
children’s expressions of involvement
Christina MacRae and Liz Jones
Education and Social Research Institute, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the term involvement in relation to children’s experi-
ences within early years pedagogy, where it is used as a marker of a qual-
ity learning environment. We explore how philosophical enquiry offers
ways of thinking more deeply about involvement as a vital quality, and
how this prompts us to move beyond universal and progressive child
development theories. Our discussion is grounded in the widely used
Leuven Scale developed by Ferre Laevers, which we view through the
prism of two data examples. The ensuing examination of both data and
the scale open an appraisal of the genealogical influences underpinning
the scale as well as an opportunity for us to re-read the scale through the
vector of Deleuzian philosophy. The paper concludes by speculating what
the repercussions might be when philosophy plays a more productive and
forceful place within the context of early years education.
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This paper explores the potential of involvement as a quality that has particular valance in relation
to early childhood pedagogies. In particular it offers a space to think productively about the signifi-
cance of involvement as a vital quality that is demonstrated by children when they play.
Involvement has been foregrounded by Ferre Laevers who has created the Leuven Scale, which is a
popular framework that highlights the degrees to which children demonstrate involvement in early
education settings. The Leuven Scale has a history that stretches back to the 1980s. However, it has
gained increasing purchase in the UK as a ‘tool’ for practitioners to use when evaluating quality in
their settings (see for example; Mathers, Linskey, Seddon, & Sylva, 2007; Woods, 2016). It is used as
an observational scale from 1–5, that allows early years practitioners to quantify the degree to which
a child is involved in a self-chosen activity. The scale gives descriptors for each level; level 5 denoting
the most involvement, and level 1 the least. The scale is based on the premise that higher levels of
involvement can be used a measures of higher quality provision.
We open the paper by briefly contextualising the Leuven Scale in relation to early years practice in
the UK, before presenting the reader with two short data vignettes based on what could be loosely
described as children’s play events. The first is drawn from Christina’s memory as a parent, whilst the
other comes from her current research project, The Sensory Nursery, where she has occupied the role of
researcher-in-residence for three years in a nursery setting located in the north-west of England.
Elsewhere, Christina, has analysed this vignette, as well as many others that form the data set from
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this slow ethnography project (MacRae, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). In this paper, the two contrasting exam-
ples offer a point of departure for a dialogue between the data and using the scale as a method of
analysis. It is a conversation that allows us to tug at the scale’s underpinnings influenced by both
Piaget’s learning theory and Gendlin’s notion of ‘felt sense’. We will explore how these concepts amplify
and affirm some theoretical threads that are alive within the scale. We raise questions about the pro-
gressive construction of knowledge inherent in the application of a rating system as well as its scientific
aspirations. While we recognise that the intention of the scales of involvement is to offer a framework
so that an observer can be attuned to the significance of experience as a capacity of learning, we
nevertheless feel there are tensions that need to be addressed. Notably, there appears to be a marriage
of compromises between a modernist genetic epistemology and a more vitalist philosophy, where
intensity within the latter is an expression of an attentional - but not necessarily - intentional body.
This exploration of how the scale makes the two vignettes intelligible allows us to both
detect and clarify Piaget’s socially inflected, but constructivist, genetic epistemology that under-
pins the scaling of involvement. We then depart from Piaget’s Cartesian cut between mind and
body haunting the Leuven Scale to follow a more Deleuzian understanding of process to think
more deeply about how movement might be productively (re)cognised as attentional, without
being necessarily intentional (conscious). This gives us a space to consider the amorphous quality
of intensity as being a significant marker of involvement. In tracing why intensity occupies such a
significant position we are also obliged to mark out some of the other philosophical underpin-
nings which Laevers references and these in turn help us to understand the importance that he
places on experience as being a key site of learning.
Returning once more to the two vignettes, we bring Deleuze back into our conversation so as to
appreciate how, in applying the scales, intensity is reduced to serving a technocratic purpose. As such
this reduction frames intensity as an order word (Deleuze and Guattari, 2007, p. 118 italics added). As
MacLure clarifies, an order word is ‘disciplinary, both in the sense of commanding obedience and of
creating order’ (2016, p. 175). This leads us to ask what are the educational costs when experiences
such as intensity as well as involvement become measurement tools for making judgements?
Testing times and the technics of schools readiness
The Leuven Scale simultaneously offers a way to resist the acceleration of educational cultures of testing
that are creeping into the policies and practices of early childhood education (Moss, 2016), but at the
same time also runs the danger of leaking into professional and policy discourses of school readiness
(Bates, 2019) and an associated and incremental culture of ‘readiness’ technologies that are targeted at
dis-advantaged children (Lee, 2019). Our aim is to explore how the scale carries certain assumptions
about how children learn and valid forms of knowledge that are underpinned by a cognitive conception
of the child. By exploring the ways in which the child is framed when the scale operates as a threshold
of visibility, we are interested in ways certain actions are brought into view and others are rendered less
legible. While our focus here is to trace the theoretical underpinnings of the scale, we are also aware of
the costs of technocratic tools of measurement in relation to the ways that the scale sits within wider
neo-liberal discourses about progress and outcomes. Where anxieties concerning ‘school readiness’ circu-
late - especially in relation to those young children who are perceived as disadvantaged - diagnostic
tools run the danger of being subsumed and normalised as part of the performance of quality (Hunkin,
2018; Kilderry, 2015) in ways that accentuate a surveillance regime over young children (Lee, 2019). In
some settings the scale is also being used as a tool to encourage parental engagement with children’s
learning (Whalley, 2017), a strategy that also runs risks when intersecting with discourses around defi-
cient parenting practices (see Vincent, 2012; Vincent and Maxwell, 2016; Wall, 2010).
Notwithstanding these cautionary notes, with its focus on children’s experience(s), the Leuven Scale
certainly does offer an alternative to outcomes-based and future-oriented visons of early childhood edu-
cation. Indeed, it is possible to map the rising interest in using the scale as a staff development tool that
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counters ever-narrowing frameworks that purport to measure both ‘progress’ in ever younger children
(Robert-Holmes, 2015), and regulatory frameworks to measure ‘quality’ in terms of outcomes (Mathers
et al., 2007). As such, the scale attunes the early years practitioner to a child’s involvement as a measure
of quality: the more engaged and absorbed the child is, the deeper and richer their experience will be,
and the more complex their thinking. This tuning-in to the child’s experience has the effect of cultivat-
ing in adults what Laevers describes as an ‘empathic understanding’ (2015, p. 5) of what it is like to be a
child. By approaching the scale philosophically, we will argue, that the concept of involvement can also
go further to help us to engage more radically with the notion of becoming child. Whilst philosophy
might be detected or traced in the lineage of the scale, both its implementation and the resulting out-
comes are squarely located within a scientific paradigm. As Laevers notes, the results of administering
the scale not only ‘match the intuitions of many caretakers and teachers’ but, they give them a
‘scientifically based confirmation of what they knew already’ (Laevers, 2015, p. 8; emphasis added). We
will suggest that if the philosophical tracings that linger around the scale were a more forceful presence
then, perhaps they might provide the conduit for telling usmore than we already know.
A memory, a fieldnote and a conversation with the Leuven Scale
Our first data vignette is based on Christina’s memory of her own child who was just walking.
The second is a snippet of film data that comes from The Sensory Nursery research project where
Christina occupied the role of researcher-in-residence. The film data focuses on a period of play
between three 2/3 year-old children that occurred in the outdoors area of their nursery. Both
these two events reverberate for Christina. For her, they are both moments when a young child’s
body encounters something in the world, and where this in turn, is registered by a noticing
adult. It is this noticing that we wish to carefully attend to. As we go on to argue, such moments
have the potential to pierce the ‘threshold of visibility’ that is calibrated ‘by the categorizing
gaze that already “knows” what is and is not significant” (MacLure, 2016, p. 180). Drawing on
Deleuze, we are interested in exploring how ‘objects and settings (milieu) take on an autono-
mous, material reality’ where it is as if ‘the action floats in the situation’ (Deleuze, 1989). We sug-
gest that it is by immersing ourselves in this milieu, and by attending to the involved bodies of
children, we are ourselves might be moved and might suspend our rush for outcomes.
Vignette 1: the toddler and the spinning bracelet (a memory)
When my child Niki was nearly two years old, I was sitting on the sofa with my Aunt. I was wearing a heavy
bangle, which slipped off my arm and fell to the floor where it began to spin. I noticed the spinning bracelet but
returned back to talk to my aunt. However, my aunt was totally preoccupied with watching Niki who was just-
beginning-to-walk and was positioned next to the spinning bracelet. Niki was slowly rotating his body round and
round. My aunt’s gaze moved back and forth between the bracelet and child. I recall both of us were surprised.
Sue’s surprise stemmed from seeing a young child make sense of the moving bracelet. My surprise came from
realising that my Aunt had made me notice something about my own child that I would have passed over.
Vignette 2: Running encounters with a garage wall (a written translation of a short
slow-motion video clip of 3 children playing outside)
Sam runs towards the green metal garage. His head and body are covered in a red blanket. He bumps into
the side of the garage, making a crashing sound as his body hits the metal. Kim and Adam, who were also
running, stop. The red blanket that had been covering Sam is now on the floor. Kim and Adam watch as
Sam repeats the action. He runs even faster up to the garage wall and hits it hard with his body. This time
the noise is even louder. Adam and Kim join Sam as they too take turns to run towards the wall and crash
against it. Sometimes they take turns but on other occasions one will hold back to watch the other two
whilst they run and then crash.
While the memory of the infant spinning with the bracelet is an instance of a much younger,
solitary child, what is common in both examples is an intense bodily absorption. In both events,
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children’s bodies respond to material encounters through movement. Previously, Christina, has
written in depth about the three children running into the garage wall as an animated dance of
attunement (MacRae, 2019). However, there is more about this event that interests her, which is
about ways that pedagogical discourses have the effect of governing what can be seen and how
it is seen. This is what MacLure describes as a ‘threshold of visibility’ (2016, p. 180) through
which adults make sense of young children’s actions. Arguably, it is at this threshold where
expectations of what will be seen, and what we register as seen, get entangled. It is this
entanglement that leaks into adult bodies and which in turn affects our responses to children.
As a researcher-in-residence, Christina attends staff training sessions; these bring with them spe-
cific differentials of visibility that aim to (in)form how the early years practitioner might render
children’s actions intelligible. This further complicates Christina’s data analysis: she flounders
between her own sense-making, the sense-making of practitioners alongside her, and also the
sense-making she is being called into by early years’ professional training discourses. The Leuven
Scale has been chosen as a lens through which to think more about the two vignettes of chil-
dren at play because they have been used at one of these staff development workshops.
Returning to the two vignettes, when Christina has shared the joint-spinning of the bracelet/
infant anecdote, early years practitioners have generally valued this as a meaning-making event.
That is, they make symbolic links between the spinning object and the child’s body. However,
when Christina has shown the film of the children crashing against the garage wall to practi-
tioners, this has drawn a more mixed response. Some practitioners have expressed a degree of
surprise and even horror that the play was allowed to continue and commented that it was a
kind of play they would have truncated. This leads Christina to ask: what is it about this particu-
lar play-event that causes discomfort in adults? And accompanying this thought she is left won-
dering whether the process-oriented approaches to early years pedagogy that have become
more ubiquitous in staff training workshops might come to her aid in trying to think more
deeply about how we make sense of these events as adults. Because of her own background as
a teacher, and her immersion in common-sense early years nursery practice, she has turned to
Liz, who is removed from the everyday of nursery classrooms, in order to reflect on these ques-
tions. As a consequence, Liz comes to the vignettes with a distance that serves as an antidote to
Christina’s immersion, adding a different dimension to the analysis. As noted, it is the reverbera-
tions of the two events, rather than seeking the facts of the matter, that have propelled
Christina to embark on this joint project of thinking-together where the ambition is to consider
the two events against and within the Leuven Scale.
The Leuven Scale for Involvement
1. Low Activity: Activity at this level can be simple, stereotypic, repetitive and passive. The child is absent and
displays no energy. There is an absence of cognitive demand. The child characteristically may stare into space.
N.B. This may be a sign of inner concentration.
2. A Frequently Interrupted Activity: The child is engaged in an activity but half of the observed period includes
moments of non-activity, in which the child is not concentrating and is staring into space. There may be frequent
interruptions in the child’s concentration, but his/her Involvement is not enough to return to the activity.
3. Mainly Continuous Activity: The child is busy at an activity but it is at a routine level and the real signals for
Involvement are missing. There is some progress but energy is lacking and concentration is at a routine level.
The child can be easily distracted.
4. Continuous Activity with Intense Moments The child’s activity has intense moments during which activities at
Level 3 can come to have special meaning. Level 4 is reserved for the kind of activity seen in those intense
moments, and can be deduced from the ‘Involvement signals. This level of activity is resumed after interruptions.
Stimuli, from the surrounding environment, however attractive cannot seduce the child away from the activity.
5. Sustained Intense Activity: The child shows continuous and intense activity revealing the greatest
Involvement. In the observed period not all the signals for Involvement need be there, but the essential ones
must be present: concentration, creativity, energy and persistence. This intensity must be present for almost
all the observation period. (Ephgrave, 2015, p.215)
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Putting the Leuven Scale to work: a conversation
Our next move is to try to make sense of the toddler’s spinning, as well as of the three chil-
dren running repeatedly against the metal garage door, with reference to the Leuven Scale as
outlined above. It is the qualities of a felt sensing (of a body that is absorbed in the stuff of the
world) and flow (also an expression of a body engaged with the materiality of the world) that
Laevers explicitly associates with involvement. Laevers states that when applying the scale,
through the act of noticing, our judgements are predicated on an ‘act of empathy’ [where the
observer] ‘has to get into the experience of the child, in a sense has to become the child’
(Laevers, 2015, p. 3). His guidance further suggests that observational judgements should be
based on a two minute snapshot of time. Mimicry and posture are flagged up as possible signs
that a child is involved with an ‘intense mental activity’ and along with this come the associated
qualities of concentration, satisfaction, absorption, fascination, motivation, interest (Laevers, 2005,
p. 11). These are all qualities that if sustained over the duration of the observation will indicate
the highest two levels of involvement. By contrast, at the lower end of the scale, a child may
demonstrate passivity, stereotypic and repetitive behaviour, and lack signs of exploration.
When trying to apply the scale to the spinning bracelet and the wall-crashing events, in both
cases the children show continuous and intense bodily activity; in the case of the toddler the
duration is less than the recommended 2-minute snapshot, and in the case of the wall-crashing
the duration is over 5minutes. When we wonder what level on the involvement scale we should
place the children at, we are inclined to place both spells of activity at the highest level.
However, when we look at other sections of the scale we become less certain, and judgements
are less swiftly made. For example, when we read through the guide together, we ask ourselves
whether the moving bodies use the ‘full extent of their capabilities’, and to what extent does
the activity engage their ‘imagination’? In the case of the toddler’s spinning we might be able to
hazard that the rotation of his body is a form of translation of the idea of circularity; that in a
sense he is deliberately imitating the spinning bracelet as a form of representational translation.
Could this spinning body be perceived from the outside as revealing an internal mental image
that is (in)formation? The creation of a concept?
When we come to the three running children, we stutter because it is harder to construe the
event as being orientated towards meaning-making. The actions here appear to be repeated for the
bodily pleasure of the encounter, where the fast-moving body makes dynamic contact with a sheet
of metal that answers the children’s bodies with a vibrating sonic crash. Given that the children co-
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ordinate their run ups, and sometimes wait for each other before starting their new trajectory, we
wonder whether this is an expression of shared pleasure and conviviality. But then, when we return
to the scales it does not appear that the children are working at the limits of, what is referred to in
the scale as, cognitive demand. In the case of Sam and Kim, Christina knows from experience that
they often play together and that they are well versed in turn-taking. However, her knowledge of
Adam predisposes her to appreciate that this non-verbal interaction affords him a way to co-produce
his actions with other children – something that he often seeks to do but is usually unsuccessful at.
Does this mean, therefore, that in terms of his social development we might place Adam as a 5,
whilst Sam and Kim might be marginally lower so as to reflect ‘the fact’ that they were not really
working at the limits of their social capacities? By applying the notion of play that is operating at the
limit of a child’s capacity we are led to place Sam and Kim at a lower level. This has the effect of
judging their play as regressive, since we are aware that they are often capable of sustaining more
demanding group play. At the same it individualises and separates out the capacities of each child
in what is a collectively experienced play event.
Another question also interrupts our application of the scale in relation to quantifying the
quality of involvement. In the case of both play events the activity that so absorbed the children
was brought forth by an accidental material encounter. This means that what happened preced-
ing the encounter may well have been a moment of inattention, rather than intentional activity
that was initiated with a purpose. We now feel quite unsure how the poles of distraction and
concentration can be placed as binary opposites. According to the scale, the term ‘aim-less’ is
given as indicating a lack of involvement, and so is placed as the bottom level. This implies that
the opposite of aim-less, is goal-oriented. However, in the case of both play events that we are
trying to analyse, the trigger for the ‘strong forces’ of motivation seemingly welled up from a
chance encounter, rather than directed by intent.
We pause to reflect further. We notice that the scale works at drawing the adults’ attention to
a ‘something’ about the child that signals to the adult that they are fully involved, and that in so
doing, the scale also works on adult bodies so as to pick up signals from children. So, where a
child’s activity is seen as falling lower on the scale, a practitioner might then be more inclined to
interact with them so as to re-direct them to move their play ‘up’ to a more challenging level.
As a signal to the adult, we wonder how the scale might have the effect of working viscerally
where our bodies are called into action thus affecting our intuitive responses to children’s play.
For example, could the toddler’s spinning signal that something conceptually significant was
occurring? Could the crashing bodies of the children signal at a gut level aimless and regressive
actions thus demanding adult intervention? In order to grapple with these tensions and categor-
ical stutterings, we feel the need to trace how the Leuven Scale adds to Piaget’s constructivism
using the quality of involvement as a central figure.
The intensity of involvement
Some of the tension that we encounter as we try to put the Leuven Scale to work on our two
vignettes is that how children demonstrate the intensity of their involvement is explicit in the
guidance (the lowest rating given where ‘no energy’ is evidenced, and the highest is marked by
‘continuous intense activity’), but, what this demonstrates is more implicit. The main clue that
we have to this is in the wording of level 1 of the scale, indicating that the less intense the
experience, the less cognitively engaged the child is. In order to understand why intense activity
is correlated with cognitive demand and capability we need to spend a little time exploring
some of the philosophical genealogy behind this pedagogic scale of involvement.
Laevers brings Gendlin’s (2004) notion of ‘felt sense’ and ‘intuition’, as a way to expand on
Piaget’s vision of the child as ‘a little scientist’ (constructing knowledge about the material world
through interactions with this matter). It is the way that felt sense plays an active part in
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knowledge formation, that makes for a more ‘dynamic’ interpretation of constructivism (Laevers,
1998, p. 74). Thus, sensory-motor action is enlivened by emphasising the felt aspect of a child’s
contact with the world, and intensity of feeling becomes the dynamic force behind a more (eco)-
logical ‘discovery’ of the world. This interpretation of constructivism is further animated by what
Laevers refers to as ‘strong forces’, or ‘urges’, that drive experiential learning. Here Laevers draws
on the work Csikszentmihalyi (1979) and the idea of flow – where flow describes an optimal
mental state of engagement. Marrying the cognitive constructivism of Piaget with the social con-
structivism of Vygotsky, Laevers characterises flow as inherently propelling the child/learner to
work at the limit of their capabilities (Laevers, 1998, p. 84). This assumption of progressive devel-
opment shares continuity with the emphasis of mind over matter in Piaget’s cognitive process
where assimilation and accommodation generate increasingly complex conceptual schema.
Cognition always moves in one direction as the limits of schematic concepts are reached: it is a
direction of travel that moves from simple to complex. In contrast to Piaget, however, Laevers
gives more prominence to an amorphous sense of intensity as an engendering force and as a
place of deep knowing. This quality of on-going-ness and continual change can be more readily
detected in Piaget’s later thought where knowledge is less delineated and step-like. Piaget
describes this in more dynamic terms as ‘a perpetual construction made by exchanges between
the organism and the environment, from the biological point of view, and between thought and
its object from the cognitive point of view’ (Piaget quoted in Gauntlett, 2007, p. 130).
While Gendlin’s idea of felt sense influences Laevers, there is an unresolved tension where
Laevers talks about this knowledge process as, not only one that constructs mental representa-
tions (1998, p. 81), but one that is also driven by mental representations. The Leuven Scale
reflects this marriage of Gendlin’s felt and bodied knowing with Piaget’s emphasis on the cogni-
tive. Knowledge is arrived at through a process of bodily engagements with objects: ‘The laws of
nature and psychological insights have to be discovered bit by bit in a process requiring an
extreme openness to what natural and psychological phenomena have to tell us’ (Laevers, 1998,
p. 74). Here, body action is schematically and mentally assimilated. Repeated schematic action
results in cognitive accommodations of knowledge, motivating a more complex mind to pursue
more complex problems.
Returning to the spinning child and bracelet: the body responds by rotating with the bracelet
so that rotation is both discovered and created. Thus ‘through the residue of countless concrete
actions’ (1998, p. 83), the senses are engaged, and rotation, becomes assimilated as a mental
image. The scheme of rotation becomes sedimented progressively through time as an absolute
concept through bodily activity. Laevers might also say that it now resides in the body both at
an intuitive level, and conceptually as a schema that can be brought to mind. The body, driven
by the need for cognitive demand will then seek a new stimulus, spurred on by an exploratory
drive that is always seeking more complex and intense mental activity (Laevers, 2005, p. 27). This
is a self-organising system that naturally aligns ‘involvement’ (as an expression of mental
engagement) with complexity of knowledge. The importance of progressive cognitive demand is
critical because ‘only after the consolidation of the acquired competence does openness to the
new kinds of stimuli arise’ (Laevers 1998, p. 84). The self-organisation of this system could also
be aligned to Bateson’s ‘ecology of mind’ – a system where form is extracted from substance
(2000). What moves the body in its material engagement with the world is the unidirectional
force of a mind that continually seeks abstraction. This is a bodily knowing that is at once, both
attentional, as well as intentional. In the case of the rotating toddler, and guided by the Leuven
Scale, it is possible to perceive the experience of spinning as a process of (in)formation through
which a concept is created. However, when applying the scale in the case of the running chil-
dren, we continue to have difficulty in translating their actions in terms of cognitive demand
and concept formation. Once again, the effect of the scale causes us to hesitate and, we are
unable to place them at the top end of the involvement scale. But does this mean that the
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intensity and flow of their bodies, where they appear to be lost in the experience, has to be
ignored and thus discounted?
In order to rescue the wall-crashing from being perceived as unproductive, we need to continue
to think more about the involvement of children’s bodies and the part played by sensation in these
encounters. We want push even further in the direction of a radical philosophy of empiricism, one
that places ‘the feeling body as the storm centre of a world of pure experience’ (Livingston, 2012).
Here felt sense is not only subjectively felt, but it is always in relation to and bound up with matter
as sensed. In drawing on such a theoretical approach, force does not only emanate from the subject,
expressed as a kind of cognitive will, but rather is expressed as an unconscious ‘incorporeal will of
the body’ (original emphasis, Dyke, 2013, p. 152). We want to challenge the idea that ‘the mind
attends the body distracts’ (Ingold, 2017, p. 19). We therefore wish to consider how a philosophy of
‘incorporeal materialism’ (Massumi, 2002, p. 16) might help us to think more deeply about the inten-
sity of the felt dimension that both Gendlin and Laevers allude to.
Intensity as a philosophical opening: the distracted body and the production
of sense
At this point we follow other scholars (Olsson, 2009; Hickey-Moody 2013), to ask what would be
the potential repercussions if the field of early years education took seriously Deleuzian philoso-
phy? How might Deleuzian philosophy help augment the ‘processural continuity’ and ‘qualitative
growth’ (Massumi 2002, p. 12) that we recognise as key qualities in the identification of
‘involvement’? Working positively with the concept of involvement as a philosophical provoca-
tion, we will return to the notion of intensity, and how this might help us to think more deeply
about experiential learning. At the same time, we also want to explore a point raised by
Deleuze; that the problem with dominant models of constructivism is not that they are too
abstract, but that they are ‘not abstract enough to grasp the real incorporeality of the concrete’
(Massumi, 2002, p. 4). We deliberately adopt an expansive approach, rather than one that is a
corrective, where we work productively with Laevers’ work on involvement, in the hope of bring-
ing ‘wonder back into them’ (Massumi 2002, p. 7). By complicating the figure of abstract
thought, we raise questions about the notion of the material as an object of thought. We realise
that complicating the Leuven Scale runs the risk of antagonising those who call for clarity and
pragmatic exposition, but we argue that a more vitalist philosophy when aligned with child
development has the potential to contribute to the field of early childhood education in an era
of accountability.
Massumi suggests that it might be more helpful to use the word ‘productivism’ (2002, p. 12)
over constructivism. Like Gendlin, whose organic idea of carrying-forward (2004) expresses the
significance of continual processual movement, Deleuze (along with many others including
Massumi 2002; Ingold 2017; Olsson, 2009; Manning, 2016) emphasises both the foundational
quality of movement; both as a force in the world, as well as being an expression of attention.
Departing from Gendlin, however, these writers suggest that what makes the body move is not
necessarily directed by the subject. Massumi helps us to expand on Laevers’ notion of force by
radically distributing it beyond the subject, and in relation to sensing matter. The challenge of
theorising this dynamic quality of sensation (expressed as force) is that it cannot be seen. It is in
Massumi’s words, ‘infraempirical’ (2002, p. 160). It might be helpful here to explore an example
that Laevers makes when he illustrates the quality of felt sense using the example of when a
child goes pale in response to a door slamming caused by a draught from an open window
(1998, p. 74). The example is provided in order to distinguish between the child’s mental capabil-
ities to foresee that the door will slam as learnt knowledge, with the felt shock that is registered
by the body when the door slams. Here logical deduction (based on watching things fall over
many times) gives rise to prediction that the door will slam, but this knowing (understanding
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the laws of physics) is different from the autonomous felt shock that causes the body to startle
and skin to pale.
Massumi’s notion of the infra-empirical complicates the neat distinction that Laevers makes
between a mind predicting the door slamming, with the body-shock that registers when it does.
According to Masumi, it is also possible that the child’s awareness of the open door in combin-
ation with the feel of the breeze on their body, might result in a felt sensation that anticipates
the door’s slam, and is registered at an incorporeal but bodily level (although the child may yet
register shock when the sound does indeed come). The child’s body, the door and the breeze,
might be better understood as what Massumi calls a ‘felt reality of a relation’ (2002, p. 16). What
can be so challenging is how this feeling that unfolds in a dynamic relation-to-matter, is often
not sufficiently ‘large’ enough to register consciously (ibid). Rather than foregrounding a subject-
ive capability that reasonably predicts cause and effect, this (re)cognition of felt sense gives
greater value to a visceral anticipatory potential of an ideality that is latent at a bodily level,
rather than extracted by a conscious mind (Massumi, 2002, p. 89).
While the jolt of a startled body when a door slams is, in Massumi’s words, ‘punctual’ (2002,
p. 36) and shocking, in the case of a body rotating in response to the bracelet, the registration
takes places more co-terminously. What unites both these events is the quality of continuity, an
on-goingness where matter continues to resonate through and with the body. Similarly, the ini-
tial encounter of Sam’s body as it bumps into the garage side is another attentional shock as
sheet-metal registers with body. It is an impact that results in more movement as his body
responds by re-engaging with the wall in a repeat body-slam. It is perhaps when the body is
least intentional that there is the greatest possibility for intensity, as well as creative potential. In
both cases bodies are responsive to a material encounter. Even in the encounter, an already
attentive body might be redirected: ‘our attention can, as we say, be caught or captivated,
pulled in one direction or another, or sometimes in several directions at once’ (Ingold, 2017,
p. 19). It is the intensity of sensation in a tending body, rather than an (in)tending mind, that
seems to be the driving force at play here.
It might be helpful to remember here that Laevers hoped that the use of his scale would
assist us to try to ‘be’ like a child in order to better appreciate the quality of intensity that is
characteristic of involvement. One way to do this might be to try to slam one’s body against a
wall repeatedly, actions that recall the artist Bruce Nauman’s performance piece entitled ‘Wall
Pressure’. This was later re-performed by Marina Abramovic, who with great force pushed her
body against a glass wall at five-minute intervals over 7 h (Watanabe, 2005). While this may pro-
duce an intense involvement and heightened sensation, perhaps similar to that experienced by
the three children, this too seems insufficient to evoke the improvisatory way that the three
children’s attention was caught by the wall, and the following wave-like rises and falls of atten-
tion and alignment between the children and the wall. While Abramovic follows Nauman’s
instructions, the three children’s intense and attentional slamming responds, not through will or
effort, but rather in state of submersion where bodies are called into action through mater-
ial encounters.
Perhaps we could now follow Hickey-Moody’s suggestion that Deleuze and Guattari’s notion
of becoming-child might helpfully dislocate ‘childhood from psychological conceptual models
and teleological regimes’ (2013, p. 284). The notion of becoming-child is emphatically not a
becoming that is oriented developmentally towards adulthood, but rather a figuration of child-
hood that sees potential in the intensities of children’s doings, in terms of the capacity to affect
and be affected (ibid, 282) which produces change both in positive as well as negative terms.
Drawing on the concept of nomadism Deleuze conjures childhood as an affective space where
different lines of flight are opportunities for experimentation, finding new connections and direc-
tions, open to change, continually being made, unmade, and remade. Childhood is presented as
a field of intensities without predetermined categories of identity and experience where hierarch-
ical power and social norms are revised so that power flows in both directions, from part to
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whole and whole to part (Kennedy, 2013, p. 147). Becoming child eschews the idea of a stable
being; rather the child emerges from the self- organising capacities of organic and non-organic
materials to co-create novel formations (Lester, 2020).
Whilst we heed Hickey-Moody’s caution about the dangers of romanticising the figure of the
becoming-child, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of becoming-child does offer us a place
where the capacity to be affected in childhood is taken as a generative, rather than a less
evolved, mode of knowledge production. When Laevers invites us to try to be like a child
through attuning ourselves to their worldly involvements, he too is hoping that this will allow us
to productively recognise the integrity of children’s ways of knowing the world as gauged by
the intensity that their bodies demonstrate. However, because Piaget’s evolutionary epistemol-
ogy also haunts his scale of involvement, progress is always implied through serial points from
simple to complex, where mind triumphs over matter. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari contend
that ‘to become is not to progress or regress along a series of line’ (2007, p. 262).
Intensity, involution and sensation
For Deleuze and Guattari the intensity of involvement is the capacity to be moved by something,
and, as they make clear, it is a capacity that does not evolve by degree. Rather, they counter the
hierarchical trajectory of evolution with the term ‘involution’ – from which the word involvement
comes (2007, p. 263). In involvement’s etymological roots we see its Middle English origins:
‘enfold’ and ‘entangle’; as well as its Latin origins in involvere, where in is ‘into’ and volvere is ‘to
roll’. The emphasis here is on a relationship of contact with the world where sensation becomes
a folding-in of matter:
The question is now about bodies taken in their undifferentiated depth and in their measureless pulsation.
This depth acts in an original way, by means of its power to organize surfaces and envelop itself within
surfaces. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 142)
While the receptivity of our bodies as this ‘sensory surface’ is reduced in adulthood through
the subjection of a body to an over-coded, already signified world, it is nevertheless still present
at the level of the everyday – even though as adults we are not always conscious of it (Hickey-
Moody, 2013, p. 284). This also recalls Deleuze’s idea of becoming-child, where a sensory becom-
ing plays out in what are often minor events, triggered by the smallest of things and in unex-
pected ways.
Instead of assuming that spinning is an imitation through imagination, what happens if we
now return to the event where the toddler rotates in unison with the bracelet with an alterna-
tive notion of sensory becoming? We suggest that involvement might be a form of a latent
ideality, produced through sensation as a toddler-body feels itself through spinning, and in this
motion becomes bracelet. This is a body that feels itself differently with and through motion and
matter. This body’s senses of proprioception express ‘kinship’ through a connection at an idea-
tional level with the felt movement of the bracelet. It is the involvement of the bracelet in the
production of a concept marks where Deleuze and Guattari open up and extend both intensity
and involvement beyond a narrow sense of the cognitive as constructed by an intentional mind.
Returning to the 5-point Leuven scale, there are dangers in corralling what Laevers calls
strong forces (and Deleuze calls intensities) into a series of points within a narrative of progress
and where ‘children are asset-stripped for their conceptual value at the expense of engagement
with the material conditions of their lives’ (MacLure, 2016, p. 179). We create ahead of ourselves
a ‘catagorising gaze that already ‘knows’ what is and what is not significant’ by way of a progres-
sive developmental path that leads to a mind that ‘can be freed to go about its business in
Cartesian autonomy’ (ibid, p. 180). While we accept that Laevers’ attempt to pin down intensity
is aimed at attuning adults to the doings and productions of children, there is a danger that
once framed for technocratic purposes as a ‘scale’, it functions in the same disciplinary way as
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what Deleuze refers to as an ‘order-word’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2007, p. 120). A vertically
ordered scale runs the danger colonising childhood by imposing interpretations of behaviour as
scientific truths. They also run the risk in reinstating an understanding of child development as
unilinear and progressive (Cannella and Viruru, 2004; MacRae 2020a).
Propositions for attentional practices
In this concluding section our aim is to affirm both the significance of intensity and involvement
in relation to pedagogy that Laevers insists on, as well as to re-affirm the importance that he
places on the role of the attentional pedagogue. However, we propose that the scale itself oper-
ates to position the practitioner as looking at the child from a certain distance, and this leads us
to speculate about other ways to develop attentional pedagogies. Returning to the concepts of
proximity and distance that were raised earlier in the discussion about Deleuze’s notion of
becoming-child, we suggest that the concept of involvement and its filiation with the term invo-
lution (as opposed to evolution) might help to re-position the practitioner. We wonder what the
possibilities are for opening up events, of which the two play episodes are examples, so as to
resist formation for long enough to allow us to actualise different versions of reality that resist
judgement by decree. We also wonder what the effects might be if we speculate about ways
that becoming-child could be extended in relation to our adult-selves. Rather than be positioned
externally, where we are governed by the spurious notion that we can have a god’s eye view of
an event, we ask, what would happen if we developed attentional strategies for becoming more
involved ourselves.
Exploring the concept of involvement has allowed us to focus on ways that bodies can be
collectively attentional with both human and non-human others. It has raised the possibility that
not all learning is intentional, and it has suggested that concepts can reside outside what we
usually think of as representational thought. As a concept, involvement, when applied to the
bracelet and the garage wall events, permitted a (re)cognition of a distributed intensity that tra-
verses humans and non-humans. If it is through our own experiencing bodies that we become
involved with other bodies, then it is our ability to participate rather than to extrapolate that
becomes more productive in terms of thinking beyond what we already know. If, as adults in the
company of children, we think about the potential of involvement, then it could be implicated
in our capacities to ‘listen’ to what children’s bodies are telling us in more emergent ways
(Davies, 2014). Instead of producing instructions for better seeing, it might be productive to
focus on ways to place ourselves, more responsively, in the middle of our own experience.
We suggest that the act of filming, and particularly of (re)viewing film in slow-motion may
have the potential to engender attentional pedagogies. It may be recalled that it was the act of
viewing the children throwing themselves against the garage wall in slow-motion that caught
Christina’s attention in the first place. Also, when others have viewed the film it has caused sur-
prise. The slow-motion amplification of the force of the bodies hitting the wall has discomforted
some viewers, while others were intrigued. While we have cautioned against observation at a
distance, observation itself is an active doing that demands involvement. Altering the speed of
the event, in this instance, highlighted the responsive bodies of children, as well as setting off a
bodily response in the viewing adults. We suggest that it was the compilation of bodies, matter,
sound and movement that disturbed our usual viewings and which cut across ‘what we already
know’. Our sense is that when watching the slowed film of the children slamming their bodies
against the garage wall, as adults, we were momentarily directed towards what Wargo describes
as ‘the relational assemblages of people/objects/practices/materials’ (2018, p. 9). Slow-motion
film as a (re)viewing method is less to do with representing reality or data to be themed and
interpreted, ‘but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality (Deleuze and
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Guattari, 2007, p. 157). Experimenting with film like this could offer one way to generate curious
pedagogic practices.
Along with Laevers, we would like to call for pedagogies that are focussed on enlarging the
capacities of adults to become attuned to involvement and intensity: ones that address the chal-
lenge of activating ‘more mobile ways of paying attention to process rather than products, to
pursue life-lines rather than points’ (Lester, 2020, p. 86). We worry, that the Leuven Scale brings
with it some countervailing forces, where adults might see children as lacking when it appears
that they are falling at the low end of the scale and that this, in turn, can lead to well-inten-
tioned interventions that are underpinned by notions of linear progress. Echoing Lester, this
leads us to call for a greater emphasis on the ‘inter-connected process of adult account-ability
and response-ability’, (2020, p. 171), and the need to think more deeply about how adults take
note of children’s play, as well as how this noticing might produce response-able ways of
answering children as they play. Given the improvisational qualities of the play events that we
have centred our writing on here, we also speculate about ways as adults we can be more gen-
erous in our responses to children’s play. We therefore invoke improvisation as a potential tech-
nique of involvement that adults could themselves explore. At the same time, we also recognise
that improvised practice is always carried out in what Butler calls a ‘scene of constraint’ (2004).
In particular early years settings are heavily inscribed as a field of constraint because they are so
saturated by developmental discourse that categorises what is normal (Burman, 2017). But des-
pite such constraints we nevertheless suggest that inventing techniques for adult involvement,
such as slow-motion film and improvisation, might offer playful ways for the capacities of our
(adult) bodies to be more receptive to the involved movements of others – both human and
non-human. We also suggest that the philosophy of Deleuze can help us to reconsider ways of
watching, being and thinking with children where something happens. This ‘something’ is know-
ledge and importantly it will be knowledge that we didn’t already know.
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